انا سا AL B11951. Green,Military Branch II,Admiralty,Whitehall, London, s.w.l.2342: Borgary, 1961. M.II/389/4/61 na adaAmiú an siblin ta matibaarna petronen ceuannabL Sharma C 1311951119 فدهم لما بعد You wrote to me on the 20th September about thequestion of the Royal Navy arresting those suspected of being implicated inarms smuggling in the Persian Gulf. I am sorry that I have been so long inreplying, but your enquiry necessitated a lengthy search through a mass of ourold records. 2. I am afraid that we have been quite unable to find any precedent which wouldbe helpful to your consideration of this matter: 80 far as we can tell from ourremaining records there has never been an instance since the turn of the centurywhen the Royal Navy has discovered sufficient evidence to justify it taking adhow or its crew into port for further interrogation. Nor has it been possibleto find any record here to show that this particular aspect of preventing armssmuggling has ever been previously considered. 3. As to the legal considerations which arise, I imagine that your legal advisersmay have something to say on this. Leaving aside these considerations and lookingat the matter from the purely practical point of view, we think that unlessH.M, Ships are enabled either to arrest the dhows or their crews when there isevidence that they are engaged in arms smuggling, there is not much point in theirmaking any searches at all. Once it is discovered that H.M. Ships cannot takein smugglers it seems to us pretty certain that the news would spread rapidlyand whatever value the naval patrols have now, even their deterrent value, mightbe completely lost. For our part, therefore, we hope that it will be possibleto agree that suspects may be arrested or taken in for further questioning whenthe circumstances justify it. 4. Now that some of our frigates on patrol in the area carry Arabic speakingintelligence officers the political intelligence gathering aspect of the patrolshas increased in value. We, therefore, think that, whatever hapens to be theoutcome of the particular problem you have raised, boardings of dhows mustcontinue if we are not to lose the advantages which we have gained from theadvent of the intelligence officers I have mentioned. که نه می (W.//J. BOTTON) A. R. Walmsley, Esq., M.B.E.,Foreign Office,Whitehall, LONDON, s.w.l. THIS IS A COPYTHE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINEDIN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION3(QOF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 WJB/MG/CCB.11. wewanie
