(16511/17/569) TOP SECRET Political Agency, Kuwait. December 27, 1956. As already reported in my telegram No.347 of December 24, I had a talk the previous day with Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad on the subject of his investigations into the sabotage of the oilfields on the night of December 10-11. Shaikh Jabir, with whom I have been in regular touch on this subject and who hitherto had been reticent about the course of his enquiries, was on this occasion more optimistic and told me that he had hopes of arresting those responsible before long. I asked him whether the two men who were at present in prison in Kuwait had been able to give any information. Somewhat to my surprise Shaikh Jabir said that he had not heard that anybody had yet been arrested in connection with the incident. Likewise when I asked him whether the telephone operator al-Awni at the Ahmadi exchange had been able to help his investigations, Shaikh Jabir replied that he had not been told anything about this man. My conclusion was that, as I had already had reason to suspect, co-operation between the Security Department in Kuwait under the direction of Abdul Latif Faisel and Shaikh Jabir's security organisation in Ahmadi, has been poor. Coutts has had great difficulty in getting Abdul Latif's help and it is possible that Abdul Latif may even have been concealing informa tion from Shaikh Jabir. 2. When I called on the Ruler on December 27, I asked him whether he had any further news about the course of the investigations and said that the fact that no arrests had been made was d. 1.sturbing. It seemed to me that there might well be another attempt made on the 0111ield at any time. The Ruler said that he understood that the investigations were proceeding! but that the information available to the security authorities was slight. He could not understand, he continued, how I had 'been able to pass on information to Shaikh Jabir that an attempt at sabotage was about to be made without being able to draw on the same source for details and particularly for the names of those responsible. I could not, of course, tell the Ruler what the source was and I fear I left him with the impression that we knew more about this affair than we were prepared to dis close. 3. Despite Shaikh Jabir's apparent optimism I am reluctantly coming to the conclusion that there will very likely be no arrests in this case. The security authorities may possibly have more information than we know of and may well have, at the least, a shrewd idea of who was responsible; but assuming that the saboteurs were Egyptians, Syrians or Palestinians and that there was a measure of Kuwaiti co-operation, I doubt whether the Ruler will be ready to face the consequences which might arise Irom the arrest of such persons. I those responsible were found to be "foreign Arabs there would be pressure by the Ruler's more responsible associates to impose heavy penalties and perhaps to expel from Kuwait a number of those suspected of being in sympathy. If such steps were taken, the Ruler would /subject His Excellency Sir Bernard Burrows, K.C.M.G., British Residency, Bahrain
