CONFIDENTIAL BRITISH RESIDENCY BAHRAIN October 9, 1957 1034 LA10221 Dear Harold I am getting rather seriously concerned at the situation we are in as regards the foreign relations of Kuwait. It is most unfortunate that the two matters of the Iraq frontier demarcation and the Saudi claims to the Neutral Zone Islands should have come up at the same time. It is even more unfortunate that we seem unable to do very much to help Kuwait in either matter. So far as the Persian Gulf States are concerned the primary purpose of our association with them is that we should look after their interests abroad or in relation to foreign countries. We have after some hesitation shown ourselves able to do this for Abu Dhabi by military measures. We have also done the same for Muscat, though not being obliged to do so. But we have been singularly unsuccessful where military measures could not be taken, namely in the matters at issue between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Iraq. So far as Saudi Arabia is concerned the principal difficulty in recent years has been that the Saudis have insisted on considering as one question all the matters in dispute between them and all the Persian Gulf States and have refused to deal with Bahrain or Kuwait questions separately from the Buraimi question, and since no progress is possible on that the other matters have had to be left where they were also. The difficulty over Kuwait-Irag relations is a good deal more complicated, with Iraq's internal politics and Fahad's deviousness of mind playing an important part, but basically Kuwait's claims in both the matters now at issue are strong and reasonable. ES1534/20 CA LOS 1/22 2. The failure of the Ruler of Kuwait to make himself clear over the frontiers with Ali Mumtaz, and his refusal reported in Kuwait telegram No. 403 to me of October 8 to tell King Saud that he cannot give a concession for the "Neutral Zone" islands, are very relevant to the thought in my despatch No. 116 of August 28 that we should encourage the Persian Gulf Rulers to deal directly with neighbouring States. I touched on this matter with the Ruler of Kuwait when talking about his conversation with Ali Mumtaz. When he said that he had refrained from pressing the frontier question because it was a political one, and because we had previously asked him not to handle such questions, I said that on this occasion we had had no wish to limit what he said. He replied to the effect that it was better for him not to get involved in political questions because he often had to resist other attempts to drag him into international politics, e.g. to join the Arab League, which he was sure we would not like. In other words he feels that he can get away with a refusal to deal with any political matter on the basis of his treaty relations with us, but once this barrier was broken down he would be unable to restrict his dealings on political subjects and he would no longer be able to give a satisfactory excuse for refusing to enter into. associations which would be undesirable both to him and to us. (This is of course a rationalisation of his probable thinking. He C.M.G., C.B.E., H. Beeley Esquire, FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.I. CONFIDENTIAL
