ع E2981 981/2984/5 to WARNING: This is a FUEL/ELFUNOCOP telegram and musc not be distributed to persons outside British Government Service. No reference FUEL/ELFUNOCOP telegram should be made in a telegram in any other series. INDEXED 4+ (CYPHER) FUEL (NOCOP) FROM WASHINGTON TO MINISTRY OF FUEL AND POWER. D. 7.27 a.m. 31st January, 1943. Viscount Halifax No. 25 ELFU NOCOP 30th January, 1943. R. 2.50 p.m. 31st January, 1943, oo o o oo IMPORTANT SECRET Following for Sir William Brown and Starling. At M.A.C. (air) meeting yesterday chairman of APPAC, without consultation with us, recommended stage III Abadan 100 octane plant should not be approved (group omitted ?in) view of (a) concentration of facilities at Abadan undesirable due to vulnerability air attack (b) this further expansion of Abadan uneconomical. As alternative it was suggested that P.A.W. should be requested to investigate possibilities of producing 130 grade aviation fuel on the mainland of Saudi Arabia and at Haifa. 2. R.A.F. member of M.A.C. (air) has requested the matter be left open for one week for study on our side. 3. Please advise soonest possible: (a) estimated completion date Abadan stage III on assumption that shipments ex the United States foundation and structural materials could begin say the end of April 1943, critical items such as pumps, compressors, towers, say end of July 1943 and continue thereafter without serious delays. (b) outline of description of principal equipment that would be needed manufacture of 130 grade aviation fuel Haifa. Also estimate of time needed to complete erection after the arrival of materials on the site assuming United States engineering assistance provided as necessary. (c) Is anything known about the suitability of crudes available for Haifa and Saudi Arabia for production of high-grade aviation gasoline. 4. Regarding point (a) paragraph 1 above, we shall develop this point through RAFDEL although you may also wish to get air staff views in the light of recent change in military situation in that area. Regarding point (b) paragraph 1 above we assume that it is intended to infer that Abadan stage III would be uneconomical in terms of output per ton of materials involved, however we will investigate this point further here. 5. This development emphasises the need for United States figures for the Eastern area mentioned in paragraph 1 of Fuel Nocop 21. 6. We are not yet clear just how this matter came to be raised or whether all United States Departments concerned are in agreement. It is essential however that we have full information along the above lines as the matter is pressed (sic). 0.T.P. TP,
