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5.
H.Heto 0HO PH
Afshar asked whether, if, as he now believed, theIranians had an overwhelmingly strong legal claim to AbuMusa, this would alter the position. The Ambassador said thismight do so, but asked why if they had such a good claim theyhad not responded earlier to H.M.G's proposal some threeyears ago that both sides should sit down to examine theirrespective cases. Afshar hinted that the strength of theIranian legal claim had only recently become fully apparentto them. Emphasising that he was speaking personally theAmbassador said that if the Iranian case was such a good onehe thought it best not to press the Abu Musa issue at themoment, but to play it long, eventually perhaps taking it tothe International Court of Justice. Af shar said that theIranians had no intention of rushing things.
ct HB
6. This does not augur well for any complete "lower Gulf"package deal. (Not that we have been thinking in these termsanyway of late.) For. however desirable such a deal inprinciple, disposing of the claim to Bahrain is so importantin its own right that it would be wrong to reduce theprospects of that by trying to do everything at once.
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7. It is possible that the Iranians themselves will seekto re-introduce the lower Gulf package concept (e.g. theTunbs and Abu Musa to Iran in return for the abandonment ofthe claim to Bahrain). But we believe the Shah really isanxious to dispose ot the claim to Bahrain, and we do notthink that he would insist on such a package even if hedecided to try this gambit to see whether he could getanywhere with it.
ممه
انبا
و این را
اند
(c. D. Wiggin)
Cc. to:M. S. Weir, Esq., BAHRAIN RESIDENCY.
D. Parsons, Esq., BAHRAIN AGENCY.L. Bullard, Esq., DUBAI.A. N. Graham, Esq., KUWAIT.
J. M. Craig, Esq., JEDDA.S. L. Egerton, Esq., UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.A. B. Urwick, Esq., WASHINGTON.
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