CONFIDENTIAL Extract from a letter CAT/13/68 of 30th May from Mr. Vamey (Beirut). to Mr. Raffael, DDOSO (BOT), describing a recent conversation in Jeddah with Abdullah Mahdi, Director General of Civil Aviation Saudi Arabia 2. He told me it was intended to activate the Jeddah F.I.R. as presently defined in the I.C.A.0. MID Plan, with the F.I.C. established at Jeddah, thus bringing to an end the temporary arrangement whereby responsibility for the provision of Flight Information Service rested with Cairo and Bahrain. He was not in a hurry to do this, but thought it might come about in the early part of 1969, when his A.T.C.Os returned from training at the I.C.A.0. School in Bangkok. I mentioned the need for ample warning of this to be given to the authorities administering the adjoining F.I.Rs, in particular where there would be a need for A.F.I.N. facilities, and Mahdi said this would be done. We talked about the forthcoming MID SEA RAN meeting (in November 1968) and he made it very clear that he did not want to see any changes to the existing F.I.R. boundaries in the Arabian Peninsular/Gulf area or changes in the controlling authorities. His Government had been pressed strongly by the Syrian Government to oppose the establishment of that part of the Addis Ababa F.I.R. which extended over Southern Arabia, but this request had been rejected. 3. Mahdi referred to the fact that U.K. speaks for the Gulf States at I.C.A.0., and remarked that perhaps we would be having discussions with them in preparation for the RAN Meeting. If this were so he thought it would be mutually helpful for the U.K. to hold an informal meeting with these states, which he would be happy to attend, and perhaps we could invite Kuwait also, to discuss common problems of air space organisation as a forerunner to the RAN Meeting. 4. It is evident that Mahdi wishes to see the status quo maintained, at least at the November meeting, because he knows that he will not have been able to demon strate sufficient competence in the provision of Air Traffic Services to offer Jeddah as an alternative to Bahrain; and he must suspect the intentions of the Iranians. He is not sure what our line is to be on the future of Bahrain F.I.C. in view of our changing role in the area, and an informal meeting such as he suggested would give him part of the answer, with presumably an opportunity to persuade us should our thoughts be contrary to his interests. He was at pains to stress that he was proposing a strictly informal technical meeting, and I undertook to pass it on to the authorities in London. 5. Taking a look into the future beyond the November meeting, say in 1970/71, we can expect the Saudis to propose an extension of the Jeddah F.I.R. to include the entire Saudi Arabian airspace - this would probably be done to conincide with the introduction of the country wide radar coverage, and associated data processing equipment which Mahdi says will be the basis of his national A.I.C. system. This wouldremove from Bahrain and Cairo the responsibility which they haye under the present Plan to provide air traffic services in the upper airspace (i.e. above F.L.150) over Saudi Arabia. However, I avoided discussing this aspect with him, because with our own thoughts on the Bahrain F.I.R. in some disarray I did not wish to be faced with questions. 6. This is by way of being an interim letter on air traffic control developments in Saudi Arabia - the allied matter of training is one on which I will write after a further meeting with Mahdi here in Beirut tomorrow. Mahdi's idea of an informal technical meeting of certain Gulf States: is interesting, but you will presumably wish to have proposals for the future of the Bahrain FIC well formulated before giving serious consideration to it. It would then be necessary to consult the posts concerned, along with Tehran, who may not respond too favourably to the risk of such a meeting being seen by the Iranians to take place.
