Oman: annual review for 1972 p.20

FCO 8/2006 1973 Jan 01 - 1973 Dec 31
CONFIDENTIAL

Education was chaotic and no proper control was exercised over the increasingnumber of schoolteachers imported from other Arab countries. In some casesteachers were not paid for months. By the end of the year a new Minister,Khalfan Nasr, who is also Minister for Social Affairs and Labour, was appointedand a Jordanian expert, Dr. Omer al Shaikh, was introduced, but improvementwas still slow.
15. The Ministry of Communications was like the curate's egg and the formerMinistry of Economy, embracing agriculture, mineral resources and industry, wasunwisely incorporated into the Centre for Economic Planning and Development,which should have little or no executive function. More land was brought undercultivation but the agricultural department lacked drive and direction. There wasdelay over the distribution of town and agricultural land and the administrationof the Capital and Greater Mutran was weak and defective. The Sultan appointeda Sudanese Legal Adviser and Her Majesty's Government provided an EconomicAdviser under Technical Assistance. The British Council opened during the yearand 15 scholarships were granted.

Defence
16. The rebellion in Dhofar aroused greater international interest. Thehopes of the optimists that it might be stifled by establishing a position in strengthat Sarfit (Simba) blocking rebel supply routes on the Oman/PDRY boundarywere not fulfilled. However, the Sultan's Armed Forces undoubtedly tightenedthe screw and achieved a number of considerable successes. By establishing theSimba position and by remaining on the top of the jebel throughout the year intwo places, they confounded rebel boasts that they would never go back to thefar west or be able to stay on the jebel during the monsoon. They put heavypressure on the rebels in the east and seriously defeated them in a battle atMarbat on the 19th of July. The total number of rebels who have surrenderedsince January 1971 amounted to 620 and towards the end of the year threepolitical commissars and the information officer from the PFLOAG office inAden, came over. The Dhofari Firdat, trained by the SAS were increasinglyeffective. The PFLOAG high command, finding themselves hard pressed inDhofar, planned to start a diversion either in the UAE or northern Oman.However their plans in each case were nipped in the bud. Several membersof PFLOAG were arrested in Abu Dhabi at the end of November and in Decembernearly 40 were detained in northern Oman, where considerable caches of brandnew Chinese arms were uncovered.
17. Though they continued to fight, rebel morale fell. There were internaldissensions, the leadership was increasingly unpopular amongst the Jebalis, thesigns of progress in Salalah and on the plain were increasingly clear for all tosee and the Sultan's Armed Forces pressed them increasingly hard. The politicalcommissars defected because they calculated that the rebels could not win.
18. During May incidents boiled up on the border with PDRY for the firsttime. The rebels and the PFLOAG leadership were so concerned at theestablishment of the Simba position that they reacted by causing a diversion atHabarut and taking action across the Omani frontier. This led to an air strikeby Sultanate forces after which both sides withdrew. Subsequently PDRY forcesdestroyed the Omani fort at Habarut and the Sultan retaliated by bombing thePFLOAG camps at Hauf. Oman came out of the incidents comparativelyunscathed and sympathy in the Arab world was more with Oman than PDRY,particularly as the Sultan made it plain that he would welcome an Arab LeagueMission to establish where responsibility for aggression lay.

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