TOP SECRET received should be implemented as a matter of priority. SUMMARY 15. To summarise, operations are likely to continue at the present intensity in the absence of a political settlement, External pressure and increased supplies may stimulate the Yemenis to pose a greater threat in the long term, but the immediate danger lies in increased subversion of Protectorate tribes. 16. Adequate British forces are available or within easy reach to control present or foreseen opposition provided that full use can be made of them. The conduct of opera tions is at present severely restricted by political con siderations which prevent the maximum use being made of the flexibility and rapid striking power of rocket and cannon firing fighters. If these restrictions are not relaxed and authority given to use our forces in a sensible and economical manner, there is a danger of a build up of heavy weapons on both sides which may lead to an increased scale and intensity of land operations involving us in a long and costly campaign. 17. Furthermore, the present lack of adequate counters to Yemeni propaganda is harmful to our cause both within the Protectorate and throughout the world. RECOMMENDATIONS 18. We recommend that: (a) The Governor and Air Officer Comr.anding should be empowered to use the land and air forces at their disposal as follovs, but confining air attacks to the use of rockets and cannon fire. To neutralise fire directed at our own troops from located hostile weapons across the border. (ii) To engage enemy troops clearly forming up to invade Aden territory. (iii). To continue to engage enemy forces withdrawing across the border. (b) An effective counter propaganda organisation be developed. (c) When the report by the reconnaissance team on intelligence is received (paragraph 13 refers), urgent action to correct the present lack of intelligence from within the Yemeni should be taken. (Signed) W.F. DICKSON MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA G.F.R. TEMPLER D.A. BOYLE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.'.1. 13TH FEBRUARY, 1957. - ها - TOP SECRET
