Nos 1-44. (Described at item level) p.279

DEFE 5/73 1957 Jan 1 - Feb 19
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that the Imam achieves in his present efforts against the
Dhala and Beihan areas of the Western Aden Protectorate: if
he is successful there he will almost certainly extend his
aggression to other parts of the Western Protectorate, such
as the Audhali country, the Upper Aulegi and possibly the
Subeihi. If he is definitely repulsed he may be discouraged

and decide to pursue his aims for a time by intrigue rather
than by attack. The second factor is the extent to which
the Imam receives external encouragement and assistance.
Such encouragement might come from Egypt, the Soviet Union,
and Saudi Arabia, who have a vested interest in stirring
up trouble for H.M. Government. Conversely, if pressure
from the Western Powers, including the Americans, could be
brought to bear significantly upon these countries in order
to discourage such policies, the Yemeni effort would rapidly
diminish. The Imam is actively seeking supplies. The
ability of the Yemenis to handle complicated weapons and
equipment is at present limited, but there is reason to
assume that this deficiency is being made good.

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6. The extension of the area of operations is only likely
to arise from a combination of Saudi-Arabian and Yemeni
tribes, of which there has been one indication. If this
were to develop, operations might extend to the Eastern
Protectorate frontier with the Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

PORCES AVAILABLE

7. The main striking force available to the Governor of
Aden consists of the Royal Air Force, the Aden Protectorate
Levies and the 1st Battalion the Cameron Highlanders.
Details of the forces available, including local forces, are
shown at Appendix.

Reliability of Local Forces and Propaganda

8. The loyalty of the Aden Protectorate Levies and Govern ment Guards is primarily to their own tribes but, being
mercenaries, much depends on their pay and conditions of
service being good. Generally both forces can be relied on
for action against normal dissident activity, although
recent operations have shown an increase of desertions in
the APL when individuals have been used in their own tribal
areas. In normal frontier operations the APL, with a
stiffening of British troops, can be relied on provided there
is no marked improvement in the weapons and tactics used
against them. Government Guards are not trained for such
operations and are better employed guarding frontier posts
and sending back information. Propaganda and direct sub version has had some effect on the APL although, to date,
little on the Government Guards. There is no doubt however,
that continued hostile propaganda will have an undermining
and poisonous effect both on the Protectorate Tribes and the
outside world. In our view some effective counter to this
propaganda must be developed.

REINFORCEMENTS

9. Present plans provide for 1st Battalion Kings Shropshire
Light Infantry to be flown in from Kenya if required. The
necessary airlift would be provided from the United Kingdom.

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